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ABSTRACT 
 
The study  examines  the  value  creation  of  Merger  and  Acquisition  (M&A)  deals  in 
European  Banking from 1990-2004. This is performed, first, by examining the stock 
price reaction of banks to the announcement of M&A deals and, second, by analysing the 
determinants  of  this  reaction.  The  findings  provide  evidence  of  value  creation  in 
European banks as the shareholders of the targets  have benefited from positive and 
(statistically)  significant  abnormal  returns  while  those  of  the  acquirers  earn  small 
negative but non-significant abnormal returns. In the case of the shareholders of  the 
acquirers, domestic M&As and especially those between banks with shares listed on the 
stock market, seem to be more beneficial compared to cross-border ones or those when 
the target is unlisted.  Shareholders of the targets earn in all cases positive abnormal 
returns.   Finally,   although   the   link   between   abnormal   returns   and   fundamental 
characteristics of the banks is rather weak, it appears that the acquisition of smaller, less 
efficient  banks  generating  more  diversified  income  are  more  value  creating,  while 
acquisition of less efficient, liquid and characterised by higher credit risk banks is not a 
value creating option. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, the European banking sector has witnessed significant 
structural  changes that resulted in its consolidation through a large number of mergers 
and   acquisitions   (M&As)   and   increased   cross-shareholdings.1     The  major   factors 
contributing to these developments were  technological advances, the globalisation of 
financial  markets,  enhanced  supervision  of  credit  systems,  the  creation  of  a  single 
financial market in the European Union (EU) and the introduction of the euro. Also, in 
many countries, especially where smaller banks were active, the growth in M&As was 
attributed to banks’ desire to increase in size in order to obtain gains in terms of market 
power  and/or  efficiency as competition in the single European market increased. This 
resulted in the dramatic  drop in the number of credit institutions in the EU-15 from 
approximately 12,000 at the end of 1990 to just over 7,000 at the end of 2004, with the 
majority of M&As bring domestic deals. 
 
The importance of the banking sector for economic growth becomes evident from 
the number and value of banks’ M&As to the total number of M&As and value of all 
sectors in Europe (see Figure 1). The peak in M&A activity was recorded in 1999, while 
the average number of M&As in the post-1999 period remained well above the respective 
one in the pre-1999 period. It is also worth noting that the value of bank M&As to total 
European M&As value climbed to a double digit figure. During the  1990s, a limited 
number of cross-border bank M&As occurred in EU countries since banks in these 
countries started to be more intensively interested in expanding outside national borders, 
especially into  eastern European countries, only from 1998-99 onwards. It also worth 
noting that during the 1990s, the majority (about 80%) of bank M&A deals took place in 
four member states, namely Germany, Italy, France and Austria and involved small and 
very small banks, as these were keen to achieve adequate  size to allow survival. The 
increased number of deals between larger banks evolved from the need  for  strategic 
repositioning and conglomeration. 
Taking into account the aforementioned developments, the significant 
 
contribution of the banking sector in the credit process and in the economy and the 
 
 
1   For an extended discussion on the developments of the European banking system, see European Central 
Bank (2000, 2004). 
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extended evidence from relevant studies analysing data from US banks, it is surprising 
that only a  handful of studies have emerged to evaluate the stock market reaction to 
M&A announcements in the European banking sector (i.e. Campa and Hernando, 2006, 
Ismail and Davidson, 2005, Lepetit et al., 2004, Altunbas and Ibanez, 2004, Beitel et al., 
2004, Beitel and Schiereck, 2001, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000).2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
M&A activity in the European (EU-15) banking sector (1990-
2004) 
Number of deals (left axis) Percentage share in total European M&As (right axis) 
Transaction value in bil. euro (left axis) 
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The present study attempts to shed additional light on the value creation of M&A 
 
deals in Europe by examining the stock price reaction of banks (acquirers and targets) to 
 
 
 
 
 
2  Another set of studies, small in number and utilising outdated data, has attempted to measure profitability 
and efficiency gains through balance sheet analysis (i.e. Focarelli et al., 2002, Huizinga et al., 2001, Vander 
Vennet, 1996, 2002, Molyneux et al., 1996) providing mixed results. 
 
 
the announcement of M&A deals in the period 1990-2004 using a differentiated sample 
and modified methodology and hypotheses compared to previous research. 
First, the data employed focuses exclusively on deals between banks where the 
acquirer is a bank registered in an EU-15 country and the target is either a bank located in 
EU-15 or in an emerging eastern European country. Second, in order to analyse whether 
a stock market facilitates the efficient  dissemination of information, the study explores 
the value creation of the deals not only when banks involved in an M&A deal have shares 
listed on a stock market, the usual approach in the literature,  but also when a deal 
involves an unlisted bank. In this case of course only the share price reaction of the listed 
bank is estimated. Third, besides the typical event study methodology, abnormal returns 
were also estimated using a GARCH framework in order to capture the possible effects 
from the heteroscedastic  behaviour of share prices. In addition, a series of tests were 
employed to estimate the statistical significance of abnormal returns. Fourth, the present 
paper provides further evidence on the domestic versus cross-border deals controversy. 
Last, but not least, we analyse the determinants of abnormal returns, an issue overlooked 
in previous research. 
The main findings of the study are as follows: First, it provides evidence of value 
creation in the European banking sector as the shareholders of the targets benefited from 
by positive and statistically significant abnormal returns while those of the acquirers earn 
small negative but statistically non-significant abnormal returns. Second, in the case of 
the shareholders of the acquirers, domestic M&As and especially those between banks 
with shares listed on the stock market, seem to be more  beneficial compared to cross- 
border ones or those when the target is an unlisted bank. Third,  shareholders of the 
targets earn in all cases positive abnormal returns. Fourth, although the link  between 
abnormal returns and fundamental characteristics of the banks is rather weak, it appears 
that the  acquisition of smaller, less efficient banks generating more diversified income 
are more value creating,  while acquisition of less efficient, liquid and characterised by 
higher credit risk banks is not a value creating option. 
The study is structured as follows: the following section reviews the theoretical 
arguments  behind  the  emergence  of  M&As  together  with  the  respective  empirical 
evidence recorded on stock  market reaction to M&A announcements. Section 3 deals 
 
 
 
with the sample and the methodology and section 4 presents the empirical findings. 
Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. M&As and stock price reaction: theory and literature 
 
2.1 The rationale, advantages and risks of M&As 
 
Several arguments surround the advantages (motives) and risks of M&A deals 
and a useful summary of these is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
 
Motives and risks of domestic and cross-border M&As 
 
 Domestic M&As Cross-border M&As 
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- Economies of scale (cutting 
distribution networks and 
administrative  functions 
rationalisation including 
information  technology  and 
risk management 
- Economies of scope 
- Size 
- Diversification 
- Revenue efficiency 
- Economies of scale and scope 
- Size 
 
R
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- Operating (integrating risk 
management,  customer  and 
account systems and internal 
control procedures) 
- Cultural 
- Reputation 
- Strategic 
- Operating (increased 
compared to domestic cases 
because of cultural 
differences) 
- Accounting, reporting, 
regulation issues 
- Foreign exchange risk (when 
applicable) 
- Reputation 
- Strategic 
 
 
Economies of scale is the main argument behind M&As. This implies that banks 
proceed with M&As to reduce operating cost by cutting down branch networks and staff 
overheads and also by integrating information technology and risk management systems. 
On top of that, increased competition  generates an incentive for banks to attain the 
appropriate size in order to take advantage of the market  power and the larger capital 
base. Also, size may act as a defensive mechanism for banks wishing  to  withstand 
 
 
external  pressures  arising  from  larger  banks  that  may  want  to  expand  through 
acquisitions.  Economies of scope is another rationale for M&A deals involving banks. 
Such economies are better  exploited when a bank combines its business with another 
financial company in order to achieve  complementarities and benefits from the cross- 
selling of products from existing distribution networks. 
 
Banks may also want to expand in cross-border activities in order to gain access 
to  a  larger  client  base  and  also  to  diversify  their  sources  of  income.  This  type  of 
expansion  does  not  create  direct  benefits  from  economies  of  scale  as  it  does  not 
necessarily involve the overlapping of  operations and services; however, it may create 
cost and revenue efficiencies by exploiting the know-how transfer from the acquiring to 
the acquired bank that in most cases is smaller in size and less sophisticated. 
Of course, the benefits do not come without some cost due to the risks involved in 
these deals. Operating risk may be present due to the fact that it is not always easy to 
integrate technical systems, personnel culture and remuneration practices that could result 
in turf battles that in turn lead to the loss  of key personnel and/or clients. Risks are 
increased for cross-border deals compared to domestic ones,  as in this case cultural 
differences  are  intensified  while  differences  in  general  practices,   accounting  and 
reporting issues and regulation, the foreign clients’ perception of the deal and the foreign 
exchange risk, when applicable, provide additional obstacles. Finally, other significant 
risk factors are the reputation risk that is caused when a potential failure of the acquired 
institution would cause the reputation of the acquirer to deteriorate and the strategic risk 
that is related to misjudgement on the part of the management of the acquirer regarding 
the scope of the deal or the quality of the target. 
 
 
2.2 Bank M&As and stock price reaction: theoretical arguments 
 
The ultimate target for the management of any company, banks included, is the 
maximisation  of shareholders value that for companies having shares listed in a stock 
market is reflected in their stock price. Any announcement of an intended M&A between 
banks attracts the interest of the investment community and the banks’ shareholders as it 
gives them an opportunity to check the validity of the following two hypotheses: 
 
 
 
 
“The information hypothesis”, according to which the management team of the 
acquiring bank wants to proceed with a prospective deal because it may be aware that the 
value of the target bank is underestimated. 
“The inefficient management hypothesis”, according to which the target bank is 
obliged either to improve the operation of the bank in order to make it more efficient and 
thereby possibly prevent its  takeover, or to hand over its management to a new more 
capable management team. 
However,  an   intended   bank   M&A   does   not   necessarily   imply   that   the 
management  aims  to  maximise  shareholders  wealth.  If  the  utility  function  of  the 
management of the acquiring bank is increasing proportionately to the scale of the bank, 
it is possible that the management in  question  will proceed with the M&A simply to 
derive the greatest possible personal benefit without  taking into account the total cost 
involved in acquiring the target bank, which may be far higher than the value of the target 
bank  itself.  A  similar  case  arises  when  the  management  of  the  acquiring  bank 
overestimates its own ability to identify undervalued target banks, thus eventually paying 
a relatively high price (“hubris hypothesis”, see Roll, 1986). 
Taking into account the above arguments, the announcement of an intended M&A 
 
is expected to cause the following changes to take place in: 
 
(a) Acquiring banks’ shares: 
 
A  positive  reaction  when  the  M&A  involves  banks  which  provide  similar 
services and/or are active in the same market. A negative reaction when it is perceived 
that the M&A serves only the personal interests of the management of the acquiring bank 
rather than the interests of the shareholders. A negative reaction may also be more related 
to a cross-border expansion or to a deal that involves a less-well known bank (usually an 
unlisted one) as investors generally face information asymmetries. 
(b)Target banks’ shares: 
 
A positive reaction when either investors feel that the target bank’s share price is 
undervalued or that the management of the target bank is inefficient and that, therefore, 
the acquisition will result in efforts to improve the operation and organisational structure 
of the bank, which will in turn lead to improved performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
Capital market based research is looking into how the stock market reacts to 
announcements of M&As considering that this reaction is a major indication of how 
much the M&A is expected to affect the overall efficiency of the banks involved. In other 
words, this strand of literature  attempts to analyse whether the announcement of an 
intended M&A creates positive or negative abnormal returns for the share prices of the 
banks involved in the M&A. 
 
 
2.3 An overview of the literature 
 
Empirical research into the impact of the announcement of a bank M&A on stock 
prices has concentrated mainly on bank M&As in the US, while it is relatively limited as 
far as the European  banking  system is concerned although there is a growing research 
interest in this direction over the past  few years. The general conclusion drawn is that 
positive abnormal returns are observed in the case of the target banks’ shares, while the 
results for acquiring banks are mixed, even though there is a tendency  for abnormal 
returns to be negative or statistically insignificant in many cases. 
 
Also, looking at the overall wealth of both the acquirer and the target, despite the 
benefits  which  theoretically  should  arise  from  an  M&A  and  the  partial  transfer,  as 
observed by several researchers, of wealth from the shareholders of the acquiring bank to 
the shareholders of the target bank, it appears that, in total, stock returns in the US are not 
affected by the announcement of an M&A, as acquiring banks show a loss on average 
which offsets the profits of target banks’ shares. By contrast, in the EU, abnormal returns 
are mainly observed in the case of target banks and, to a lesser extent, in the  case of 
acquiring banks. 
In more detail, the empirical results presented in international literature may be 
summarised as follows: 
(a)Acquiring banks 
 
In the  studies  based  on  daily  data,  the  results  show  that,  following  M&A 
announcements in US, stock prices of acquiring banks show positive but low abnormal 
returns before the announcement for a period of ten days or less (see Pettway and Trifts, 
1985, James and Wier, 1987, Bertin et al., 1989). By contrast, in another case, abnormal 
 
 
 
 
returns appear to be negative for a period of four days before the announcement (see 
 
Houston and Ryngaert, 1994).3 
 
In the studies based on weekly data, negative abnormal returns were observed for 
a period of 4 to 20 weeks after the announcement date (see Wall and Gup, 1989, Trifts 
and Scanlon, 1987), while in studies carried out using monthly data, negative abnormal 
returns were noted for a period of up to 36 months following the announcement date (see 
Madura  and  Wiant,  1994).  In  these  cases,  i.e.  in  cases  where  the  abnormal  returns 
continue for a relatively long period following announcement date, a possible cause is the 
inefficient operation of the stock market, or the fact that investors gradually change their 
expectations because the M&As appear to have brought about fewer benefits than had 
initially been discounted at the announcement date (see Piloff and Santomero, 1998). 
The results are also contradictory in cases where the abnormal returns cover both 
the  period  before  and  after  the  announcement  date.  Specifically,  in  some  studies  a 
positive abnormal return is  observed on the announcement date and on both the day 
before or the day after (see Desai and Stover, 1985, Cornett and De, 1991),4  while other 
studies report negative abnormal returns for a period of one day before the announcement 
to one day after the announcement (see Kaen and Tehranian, 1989) and for a period of 
five days before and after the announcement date (see Baradwaj et al., 1990, 1992). 
Finally,  on  another  occasion,  abnormal  returns  varied  from  positive  to  negative 
depending on  the  period when the analysis was carried out (see Dubofsky and Frazer, 
1989). 
Looking at evidence based on M&As in Europe, the first attempt by Cybo-Ottone 
and Murgia  (2000) resulted in contradictory results in comparison to US studies as in 
some cases they reported positive abnormal returns which lasted for a period of 20 days 
before until 20 days after the  announcement date. The results of Bietel and Schiereck 
(2001) and Ismail and Davidson (2004) are also in line with the findings of Cybo-Ottone 
and Murgia (2000), with the latter study presenting larger differentiation in terms of the 
value of the abnormal return. Finally, Campa and Hernando (2006) found virtually zero 
 
 
3   Abnormal returns appearing before the announcement date may be related to insider trading or rumours 
leaking out before the deal are publicly announced. 
4   Cornett and De (1991), however, observe that the positive abnormal return for acquiring banks became 
gradually negative for a period of up to 15 days from the announcement date. 
 
 
abnormal returns for the acquiring banks for the period surrounding the announcement 
 
date. 
 
(b)Target banks 
 
In  the   US,   most   studies   find   that   the   stock   market   reaction   to   M&A 
announcements was positive for target banks’ shares for a period of 15 days before and 
after the announcement date  (see Hannan and Wolken, 1989, Cornett and De, 1991). 
Also, the cumulative average abnormal returns following the announcement date remain 
positive for a period of up to 15 days following the  announcement date, despite the 
occurrence of some negative abnormal returns in the same period,  mainly due to the 
systematic appearance of positive abnormal returns up to the announcement date.  In 
another case, positive abnormal returns are only noted during the four days preceding the 
announcement (see Houston and Ryngaert, 1994). 
In studies which utilise weekly data, positive abnormal returns extend for a period 
beginning 40 weeks prior to the announcement date and continuing for 30 weeks after 
this  date  (see  Trifts  and  Scanlon,  1987,  Neely,  1987,  De  Cossio  et  al.,  1988,  and 
Hawawini  and  Swary,  1990).  Trifts  and  Scanlon  (1987)  in  particular  observed  that 
acquiring banks presented positive cumulative abnormal returns for the period beginning 
40 weeks before the announcement date and continuing up to 20 weeks after the date. 
However, for the separate 20-week period following the announcement date, the results 
were  statistically  insignificant. Moreover,  in  instances  where  abnormal  returns  are 
pinpointed for shares of both the acquiring and  the target banks, the latter appear to 
benefit more than the former (see Zhang, 1995, Becher, 2000). 
Studies based on data from M&As in Europe provide similar results to those 
reported for US data. However, there are observed significant quantitatively differences 
between  the  studies  that  analyse  European  M&As,  mainly  due  to  the  period  under 
examination or the number of firms that  were included in the sample used. The first 
studies (Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000, Bietel and  Schiereck, 2001) report relatively 
higher abnormal returns, closer to those observed in US studies, while the latest studies 
(Ismail and Davidson, 2004, Campa and Hernando, 2006) present more conservative 
results, still positive and statistically significant though, with the difference attributed to 
the different structure of the utilised samples. 
 
 
Finally, there is limited and inconclusive evidence on the benefits of domestic 
versus cross-border expansion with Campa and Hernando (2006), Lepetit et al. (2004), 
Beitel  and  Schiereck  (2001)  and  Cybo-Ottone  and  Murgia  (2000)  presenting  results 
indicating that domestic deals are more  beneficial, whilst Ismail and Davidson (2004) 
reach, in some cases, the opposite conclusion. 
 
 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1 Data sample 
 
The prime source of the bank M&As transactions examined in the present study is 
the “Thomson Financial Securities Data Company –Mergers and Acquisitions database”, 
while information related to  share prices and balance-sheet data was collected from 
Bloomberg L.P. 
The  selected  sample  includes  all  finalised  (completed)5    M&A  transactions 
 
announced between 1990 and 2004 when the acquirer was a bank registered in any of the 
EU-15 countries and the target was a bank registered either in a EU-15 country or in an 
Eastern European country. In addition, banks included in the sample were not involved in 
more than one deal during the year under examination in order to isolate the information 
content of specific deals. As for share prices the norm was followed utilising daily prices. 
Specifically, for each deal, we required that the shares of at least one of the two banks 
participating in the deal to be listed in on organised exchange for at least one year (252 
trading days) prior to announcement date and for at least 20 trading days following the 
announcement. Additionally, for the same length of period, prices of the composite stock 
market  indices  for  each  country  in  which  the  involved  banks  are  domiciled  were 
collected. Regarding balance-sheet data, we required complete information on net interest 
income,  revenues,  costs,  provisions,  profits,  loans,  deposits  and  total  assets,  as  this 
information was vital for the construction of variables that are used in the second part of 
the study in an attempt to explain the determinants of share price reaction to the M&A 
announcements. Table 2 reports a summary report of the identified transactions. 
 
 
5  The database includes all types of deals, including pending and withdrawn ones which are excluded in the 
current analysis. 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 
Sample distribution of European banks M&As deal announcements 
 
No of Acquirers No of Targets 
Listed Non-listed 
Domestic Cross-border Domestic Cross-border 
 
Listed 
 
145 
 
34 
 
14 
 
42 
 
55 
 
Non-listed 
 
25 
 
18 
 
5 
 
- 
 
- 
Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data Company. 
 
 
The sample used in this study differs from those of other studies examining the 
European market (e.g. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000, Beitel and Schiereck, 2001, Beitel 
et al., 2004, Lepetit et al., 2004, Ismail and Davidson, 2005, Campa and Hernando, 2006) 
in that: a) it spans a longer period (1990-2004); b) it focuses only on banking deals within 
EU-15 and Eastern Europe, in contrast to other  studies that utilised a sample included 
companies from the financial sector in general; c) it does not restrict the sample requiring 
both the acquiring and the target bank having their shares listed on an organised stock 
exchange  and  therefore  conclusions  can  be  reached  regarding  the  potential  different 
reaction of the market to deals involving banks not listed on an exchange (i.e. due to 
information  asymmetries); and d) it utilises balance-sheet data, an approach followed 
only by Bietel et al. (2004) and to some extend by Campa and Hernando (2006). 
The initial sample collected comprised nearly 2,800 M&A deals. However, the 
criteria that  were subsequently imposed restricted the final number of examined deals. 
The major requirement was that at least one of the banks involved in an M&A deal was 
listed on an organised exchange. This restricted the initial sample to 145 acquirers having 
their shares listed on an organised exchange and 25 which did not, with the respective 
numbers for the targets being 71 and 97.  The number of domestic deals outperformed 
cross-border ones, with the majority of the latter involving non-listed banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
3.2.1 Event study 
 
As already mentioned, the aim of the present study is to analyse the shareholders’ 
value  creation   of  bank  M&A  deals.  For  this  reason,  a  standard  “event  study” 
methodology is adopted, a brief analysis of which follows. A key supposition underlying 
this method is the hypothesis that stock market prices fully and immediately incorporate 
all available information (market efficiency hypothesis). As a result, the announcement of 
an event such as an M&A deal leads to a rapid adjustment of the stock price connected 
with this event. In order to assess the significance of this price adjustment, an asset 
pricing model is used. Utilising such a model, as the market model in our case, which is 
the most commonly used one in the relevant literature, the linear relationship between the 
expected return of a share and the market portfolio may be given by equation (1): 
Rit  = ai  + bi  Rmt + eit  , (1) 
where: Rit  is the expected return6  of share i at time (day) t, Rmt is the return of the market 
portfolio m at time (day) t, ai, bi  are the coefficients of the model, eit  is a statistical error 
term having an expected value E(eit) =0, constant variance Var (eit)=σ2
 
 
and E(e , e 
 
)=0,  
for every i≠j. 
ei it i,t-j 
 
The econometric estimation of the ai  and bi  coefficients in equation (1) and, by 
extension, of the expected returns of share i will be carried out using the Ordinary Least 
Squares  (OLS)  method  for  the  period  between  252  and  21  trading  days  before  the 
announcement date. In addition to OLS estimation, equation (1) was also estimated by 
the use of a GARCH-type model in order to capture a well-known stylised fact that stock 
returns are characterised by time-varying volatility and volatility clustering effects (see 
for example Bollerslev, 1986, Akgiray, 1989). Specifically, an asymmetric GARCH-type 
model was adopted based on the well documented empirical finding that volatility is 
more sensitive to negative shocks compared to positive ones (see for example Nelson, 
1991). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6  All returns in this study are calculated as the difference of natural logarithms of respective share prices. 
 
 
 
The estimated coefficients 
^ 
ai and 
^ 
bi are then replaced in equation (1) in order to 
 
 
calculate the expected return 
^ 
Rit 
 
for each share i. Abnormal returns for each share i 
 
(ARi) are derived using equation (2): 
 
 
ARit  = Rit  - 
 
^ 
Rit  , (2) 
In order to draw inferences regarding the specific event, calculated abnormal 
returns must be first aggregated as shown in equation (3): 
 
1  N 
ARt  = ∑ ARit  , (3) N j=1 
 
where: N is the number of banks under examination. 
Whilst calculating abnormal returns provides an indication of the impact of the 
event, this  indication refers only to individual time points. To investigate the ongoing 
impact of an event on share prices, average abnormal returns must be aggregated through 
time in accordance with equation (4): 
 
t2      
CAR[t1, t2] =  ∑ ARt , (4)7 
t =t1 
 
where: CAR[t1, t2] is the cumulative abnormal return for the period [t1, t2]. 
 
In the literature, various calculation periods of the cumulative abnormal returns 
are employed.  The present study, in addition to the examination of the announcement 
date (t0) reaction, utilises the most commonly used event window ranging from 20 days 
before to 20 days after the announcement date, i.e. [-20, +20]. Three intermediate time 
intervals [-20, 0], [-10, 0], and [-1, +1] are also used to validate the results. 
Equations (1) to (4) are separately estimated for acquirers and targets and for 
different  classifications within these two categories (i.e. national versus cross-border 
deals). A combined analysis, examining the sample as a whole, was not adopted as, in 
contrast to other relevant studies, we chose to include in the sample banks having shares 
not-listed on any organised stock exchange and therefore there were cases when a listed 
acquirer (target) made a deal with a non-listed target (acquirer)  and consequently the 
focus was on the individual reaction of acquirers and targets. 
 
 
 
7  Equivalently, one can calculate CARs by share and aggregate through time. 
 
 
SCAR =
N
i
2
) 
⎜ 
2
The statistical significance for both the abnormal and cumulative abnormal return 
can be assessed following a number of methods (see Campbell et al., 1987) with the most 
typical one being a traditional t-test.8  However, the main limitation of most tests applied 
in event studies, including the traditional t-test, is the assumption that the “event” affects 
only the mean return, if any. Therefore, in case the event  affects also the variance of 
returns around the event date, the use of non-event period data for the estimation of the 
variance of abnormal returns, a necessary calculation for statistical inference, will result 
to an often rejection of the null hypothesis that there is no significant reaction. In order to 
alleviate  this  problem,  Boehmer  et  al.  (1991)  suggest  that  the  variance  of  average 
abnormal returns is estimated from the cross-section of abnormal returns of any particular 
date. In more detail, a standardised CAR (SCAR) can be written as: 
 
CAR[t1, t2] 
[t1, t2] ^ 
σit, [t1, t2] 
 
, (5) 
 
^ ^ 
where: σit  is estimated by the market model as (t2-t1+1) σ 2 ei   . 
Boehmer et al. (1991), hereinafter BMP, propose the following test: 
SCAR[t1, t2] 
BMP = 
1  ∑ (SCARi [t1, t2] N i =1 
2 
- SCAR[t1, t2] 
, (6) 
In addition to the BMP test, in order to verify our results, the non-parametric test 
of Corrado (1989) was also employed. This test has the advantage that it does not take 
into account the abnormal  returns’ distribution since, by using ranks, it neutralises the 
statistical effect (such as outliers, skewness etc.) of abnormal returns. To implement the 
test, each bank’s abnormal return for the whole period of the study (estimation and event 
period) is assigned a rank, starting with the rank of one for the lowest abnormal return. 
Then, the ranks in the event period for each firm are compared with the expected average 
rank under the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns. Assuming that Kit  is the rank for 
 
 
^ 
8   The traditional t-test assumes that the distribution of CAR is normal with mean µ and variance σ2   and 
 
CAR[t1, t2] therefore the test is derived as t[t1, t2)  = ⎛   1 N ⎞ ∑σ 2 ⎟ ⎝ N i =1 ⎠ 
 
 
1T N 
1
bank i at time t and T is the number of observations for the estimation and event period, 
the average expected rank for bank i is: 
Ki  = 0.5 + Ti/2 , (7) 
Using (7), the Corrado (C) test for event date 0 is specified as follows: 
 
 
 
N    
∑ (Kio - Ki) 
C = N i =1 
 
, (8) 
1  T 1 N 2 
T ∑ N 2   ∑ (Kit - Ki) t =1 t =1 
 
 
 
For multi-week periods (L), the test becomes: 
 
 
 
L N    
∑ ∑ (Kil - Ki) 
C=    l=1       N i =1  
1  
, (9) 
1  T 1 N      
2 L 
∑ 
t =1 
2   ∑ 
t =1 
(Kit  - Ki ) 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Analysing the determinants of abnormal returns 
 
As already mentioned, the handful of studies dealing with M&A announcements 
in the  European banking industry are mainly concerned with the stock price reaction 
surrounding the  announcement date, while they provide limited evidence regarding the 
factors that may explain this reaction. The present study builds on the estimated abnormal 
returns and attempts to identify the factors that drive the results. For this reason several 
factors, which are analysed in Table 3, are considered and their choice aims to provide 
evidence on the effect of the “general characteristics of the deals”, as  well  as of the 
“fundamental characteristics” of the banks involved. More specifically, regarding the 
former: 
 
¾  “Target”: aims to differentiate the reaction between acquirers and targets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¾  “Dom”: proxies the geographic focus of the deal as domestic deals provide better 
opportunities  for synergy benefits while cross-border expansion is expected to 
provide income and risk diversification benefits. 
¾  “Listed”: attempts to provide evidence regarding the mechanism of the stock 
market   to   facilitate   the   efficient   process   and   dissemination   of   available 
information as listed banks are expected to provide more quality disclosures. 
¾  “Cult”: analyses the geographic focus in an attempt to examine whether the 
cultural difference between the countries in which an acquirer and a target bank 
are domiciled may explain the abnormal returns. One hypothesis is that a greater 
cultural difference9  between two countries increases acquisitions costs, negatively 
affecting an M&A deal. However, an  alternative hypothesis suggests that the 
greater  the  cultural  difference  the  greater  the   diversification  benefits.  For 
example, Charkrabari et al. (2005) studying the impact of the culture on the long- 
term performance of M&As (including also M&As from sectors other than the 
financial one)  reported that the greater the cultural distance between the two 
firms, the better the combined firm performs in the long run. 
Regarding the fundamental characteristics (balance-sheet information) of banks: 
 
¾  “ROE”(Return  on  Equity):  is  a  major  indicator  of  banks  performance.  More 
profitable banks can withstand shocks in the economy, while in M&A deals they 
can facilitate the transfer of resources from the more profitable bank to the less 
profitable one with the overall effect on  the  combined entity being difficult to 
estimate. 
¾  “Size”: is also an important variable as the merger between two large banks may 
entail more benefits in terms of scale economies (cost reduction through synergy) 
but involves a far more complex procedure compared to a deal between a large 
and a small bank. 
¾  “Liq”:  liquidity  is  also  considered  as  an  important  variable  in  banking  as  it 
indicates the  ability of the banks to further expand their business while at the 
same time having a buffer on which they can rely in adverse market conditions. A 
 
 
 
9    The cultural differences are based on the proposed methodology found in Hofstede’s (1980) work, a 
summary of which is reported in the Appendix. 
 
 
deal between a bank having good liquidity and one that does not may provide 
more  distribution channels for the more liquid bank to expand its business by 
utilising those of the less liquid bank that is not in a position to exploit. 
¾  “Prov”: proxies the credit risk providing an indication of how aggressive a bank is 
in its expansion and/or how advanced its risk management systems are. In either 
case, a deal may facilitate the transfer of know-how providing also some, minor 
maybe, diversification benefits. 
¾  “Eff”: is an efficient measure and proxies how effectively a bank utilises its 
expenses in order to generate income. An efficient bank can transfer its superior 
skills to another bank through a deal in an attempt for the overall entity to realise 
efficiency potentials. 
¾  “Nii-Ti” (the share of interest related income to total income): provides evidence 
on how diversified are the sources of income. A deal involving two banks having 
a high ratio may result  in wealth creation due to the effect of product focus. 
However, there is also the argument  that an M&A deal may be more valuable 
when it provides better diversification in the income sources as this makes banks 
less vulnerable to external shocks. 
¾  “Value”:  examines  whether  the  value  of  the  deal  may  affect  the  investors’ 
response in case they consider that the acquirer pays too much or too little given 
the value of the target. 
¾  “Year”: proxies the market conditions that prevail in particular years in which the 
M&As took  place since it is a fact that in bull markets M&A deals increase 
creating the incentive to check whether market conditions affect the way investors 
react to M&As announcements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Description of bank-specific variables 
 
Variables Description 
Target A binary variable taking the value of 1 if 
the bank is a target and the value of 0 
otherwise. 
Dom A binary variable taking the value of 1 if 
the M&A deal is domestic and the value 
of 0 otherwise. 
Listed A binary variable taking the value of 1 if 
the bank lists its shares in an organised 
stock   exchange   and   the   value   of   0 
otherwise. 
Cult The culture index as described by 
Hofstede (1980) and is presented in the 
Appendix. 
ROE Return  of  Equity  of  the  bank  under 
consideration. 
Size The size of the bank under considerations 
as measured by the natural logarithm of 
its total assets. 
Liq A liquidity  measure  of  the  bank  under 
consideration  measured  as  the  loans  to 
deposits ratio. 
Prov A credit  risk  proxy  of  the  bank  under 
consideration measured as the provisions 
to loans ratio. 
Eff An efficiency  proxy  of  the  bank  under 
consideration measured by the operating 
expenses to operating income ratio. 
Nii-Ti An income  diversification  proxy  of  the 
bank  under  consideration  measured  by 
the  Net  Interest Margin to Total Income 
ratio. 
Value The value of the deal measured in billions 
of US dollars. 
Year A binary variable taking the value of 1 if 
an M&A announced in a year with the 
stock  market  reported  a  positive  return 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Two types of models were utilised, a typical OLS regression and a Probit-type 
regression.  The  purpose  of  using  a  Probit  model  was  twofold.  First,  to  verify  the 
 
 
 
 
inferences drawn  from  OLS  estimations,  and  second  to  provide  additional  evidence 
employing a set of binary, dependent and independent, variables that attempt to capture a 
size effect by dividing the variables according to their cross-section median. Equations 
(10) and (11) below will be estimated by the OLS and the Probit methods respectively: 
 
n 
CAR[t1, t2] = a0 + ∑ 
i =1 
 
 
ai  Xi  + et  , (10) 
 
where: CAR[t1, t2] is the cumulative abnormal return for the period [t1, t2] as described in 
equation (4), Xi  is the vector of n independent variables and et  is the error term. Equation 
(10) will be estimated for  the whole sample as well as separately for acquirers and 
targets. 
 
n 
Yi  = β0  + ∑ 
i =1 
 
 
βi  Zi  + et  , (11) 
 
where: Yi  = 1 if  CAR[t1, t2] ≥ 0 
 
Yi  = 0 if  CAR[t1, t2] < 0 
 
and, in comparison to equation (5), all Zi   variables are binary with the non-binary 
variables of Table 3 being also translated to binary ones by taking the value of 1 when the 
respective values are above their cross-section median and 0 otherwise. 
Although  equations  (10)  and  (11)  provide  an  indication  of  the  potential 
explanation of  cumulative abnormal returns for the total sample, in an attempt to shed 
additional lights to the factors  that determine those returns, both equations will be re- 
estimated using an additional set of variables as  for a matched sample of bidders and 
targets for which balance sheet data are jointly available. The  new variables (Relroe, 
Relsize, Relliq, Relprov, Releff, Rel-Nii_Ti) representing the fundamental characteristics 
of the banks are simply the ratios of the acquirers divided by the ratios of the targets 
(using balance sheet data as described in Table 3). 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 M&A announcement and market reaction 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the [-20, +20] days window for both 
acquirers and targets as well as CAR’s for different event windows are reported in Figure 
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2 and Table 4 respectively. Two striking features emerge. The first, is the downward bias 
in the results for both acquirers and targets under the OLS estimation in comparison to 
the GARCH one. The second, being consistent with the consensus in the literature is the 
clear  differentiation  between  the  returns  achieved  by  the  two  groups  of  banks.  In 
particular, shareholders of the acquirers do not seem to enjoy value creation as a negative 
reaction to the M&A announcement is observed. However, this negative reaction is short- 
lived and smaller in size compared to the literature and not statistically significant at any 
examined event window. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers and 
targets 
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As reported in Table 4, the reaction for acquiring banks at event date [0]10  is 
-0.08% and -0.07% under the OLS and GARCH estimation respectively. During the 
whole  41  days  event  period  the  negative  reaction  amounted  to  -0.79%  and  -0.51% 
respectively. These findings are in line with Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) who also 
reported negative, but not statistically  significant,  abnormal returns for the acquiring 
banks. The findings also support those of Beitel and  Schiereck (2001) and, partially, 
those of Ismail and Davidson (2005) who also found an insignificant  albeit positive 
market reaction for acquirers in the European market. With respect to studies for US 
banks (e.g. Baradwaj et al., 1990, Cornett and Tehranian, 1992, Siems, 1996, Kane, 1999, 
DeLong,  1999)  the  present  study  reports,  on  average,  higher  abnormal  returns  for 
acquirers. 
 
Table 4 
Cumulative abnormal returns of Acquirers and Targets 
at various intervals (total sample) 
 
 Acquirers (N=145) Targets (N=71) 
CAR (%) No of deals CAR (%) No of deals 
Event 
window 
OLS GARC 
H 
With 
positive 
CAR 
with 
negative 
CAR 
OLS GARCH with 
positive 
CAR 
with 
negative 
CAR 
 
[-20; 0] 
[-10; 0] 
[-1; 1] 
0 
[-10; 10] 
[-20; 20] 
 
-0.33 
 
-0.33 
 
-0.23 
 
-0.08 
 
-0.70 
 
-0.79 
 
-0.18 
 
-0.28 
 
-0.22 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.59 
 
-0.51 
 
73 
 
71 
 
69 
 
73 
 
64 
 
68 
 
79 
 
81 
 
83 
 
79 
 
88 
 
84 
 
5.381,2 
 
4.221,2 
 
3.361,2 
 
2.011,2 
 
6.021,2 
 
6.601,2 
 
6.181,2 
 
4.611,2 
 
3.471,2 
 
2.031,2 
 
6.691,2 
 
8.031,2 
 
49 
 
48 
 
47 
 
47 
 
48 
 
47 
 
22 
 
23 
 
24 
 
24 
 
23 
 
24 
Note: 1, 2 denote significance at the 5% level of significance for the BMP and the Corrado tests 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10   We note that in some cases the announcement may have taken place either before the market open, or 
during the operation of the market or after the market closed. Therefore, it is possible that the effect may 
not be fully captured by the abnormal return reported for the event date. This is why the different event 
windows reported in the results also include the [-1, +1] window. 
 
 
In  contrast  to  the  aforementioned  results,  target  banks’  shareholders  enjoy 
significant value creation as reported in Figure 2 and Table 4. The abnormal return at the 
event  date  amounts  to  2.01%   and  2.03%  for  the  OLS  and  GARCH  estimation 
respectively, further increased by more that 1%  for  the [-1, +1] window and jump to 
8.03% for the [-20, +20] window under the GARCH estimation (6.60% under the OLS 
estimation).  Also, the CARs are statistically significant at all event windows. These 
results are derived despite the fact that approximately one third of the CARs is negative, 
evidence  also   reported  by  Ismail  and  Davidson  (2005).  In  addition,  information 
concerning the deal appears to be gradually leaking into the market starting from a few 
days before the actual announcement takes place. This indicates either rumour dispersion 
concerning M&As or that inside information is exploited in carrying out transactions, a 
phenomenon which is also observed in other cases of M&As involving banks in the US 
and the EU. 
In general, the results are in line with the majority of studies that report value 
creation for the shareholders of the targets, albeit lower in comparison to many of them, 
especially to those dealing with European banks (Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000, Beitel 
and Schiereck, 2001, Ismail and Davidson, 2005) indicating that acquirers in Europe do 
not generally pay relatively high prices for target banks. A possible explanation for this is 
that the increasing competition observed in the European banking  industry  during the 
period  under  examination  in  the  present study  made  acquiring  banks  more  cautious 
during their expansion with their management priority focusing on cost rationalisation 
and the maintenance of present position and secondarily on expansion. 
In order  to  shed  more  light  on  the  results,  different  sub-samples  were  also 
analysed  in   an   attempt  to  identify  potential  differences  regarding  the  impact  of 
geographic diversification11  or the effect of being listed on a stock exchange. Also note 
that all results being discussed hereinafter concern abnormal returns estimated with the 
GARCH   model   since   as   evidenced   above   OLS   estimations   biases   the   results 
downwards.12 
 
 
 
11   As the focus of the study is on banks, geographic diversification was the only dimension that could be 
examined. However, a proxy for product diversification is also broached following the econometric study 
in the second part of the results. 
12  All estimations were also carried out using OLS and the qualitative results do not 
differ. 
 
 
Tables  5  and  6  report  the  results  for  “national  versus  cross-border  deals” 
separately for the cases when the acquirer or the target bank is listed on a stock exchange 
or not. In general, qualitative  differences are detected for the acquirers while for the 
targets, apart from the magnitude of CARs, no significant differences are detected. 
 
 
Table 5 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns of acquirers for different classifications of targets 
(GARCH estimation) 
 
 Target listed (N=48) Target not-listed (N=97) 
CAR (%) CAR 
difference 
 
 
 
 
 
(3)=(2)-(1) 
CAR (%) CAR 
difference 
 
 
 
 
 
(3)=(2)-(1) 
Event 
window 
Domestic 
deals 
(N=34) 
 
(1) 
Cross- 
border deals 
(N=14) 
 
(2) 
Domestic 
deals 
(N=42) 
 
(1) 
Cross- 
border deals 
(N=55) 
 
(2) 
 
[-20; 0] 
[-10; 0] 
[-1; 1] 
0 
[-10; 10] 
[-20; 20] 
 
0.991 
 
0.771 
 
0.59 
 
0.31 
 
1.041 
 
1.231,2 
 
-0.42 
 
-0.35 
 
-0.60* 
 
-0.33 
 
-0.87 
 
-1.181,2 
 
1.41 
 
1.13 
 
1.19 
 
0.64 
 
1.91 
 
2.41** 
 
-0.891 
 
-0.77 
 
-0.50 
 
-0.26 
 
-1.471,2 
 
-1.601,2 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.41 
 
-0.27 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.651 
 
-0.32 
 
0.74 
 
0.36 
 
0.23 
 
0.23 
 
0.83 
 
1.27 
Notes: 1, 2 denote significance at the 5% level of significance for the BMP and the Corrado tests 
respectively. 
* (**) denote significance at the 5% (10%) level of significance for the CAR difference 
(t-test). 
 
 
More specifically, from Table 5, it is clear at all examined windows that, when 
the  target  is  a  listed  bank,  CARs  for  acquirers  are  positive  for  domestic  deals  and 
negative for cross-border ones and statistically significant in most cases. Examining the 
statistical  significance  of  the  differences  between  national  and  cross-border  deals, 
however, we detect significant differences only for the [-20, +20] window. These results 
provide an indication that shareholders of acquirer banks do not exploit any benefits from 
cross-border  expansion  despite  the  theoretical  advantage  that  such  deals  carry  with 
respect to income and risk diversification. Alternatively, it may be difficult for investors 
 
 
to assess the expected benefits from geographic diversification. Probably, cultural, legal, 
accounting and  informational factors pose significant barriers despite the large steps 
towards integration that have been undertaken in the European environment. The results 
are in line with Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), Beitel and Schiereck (2001) and Lepetit 
et al. (2004), but in some period windows differ with those  reported by Ismail and 
Davidson (2005). The results are also in line with US studies in which intrastate M&As 
seem to be more value creating compared to interstate ones (see for example Houston and 
Ryngaert, 1984, DeLong, 1999). 
However, a different conclusion compared to the one for the acquirers is reached 
when target  banks are not listed on an organised stock exchange. In this case, both 
national and cross-border deals destroy value for the shareholders of acquiring banks with 
the CARs for domestic deals reaching -1.60% for the [-20, +20] window. These results 
indicate the importance of the stock exchange as a discipline and monitoring mechanism 
since  the  negative  reaction  to  an  M&A  announcement  involving  a  non-listed  bank 
indicates concerns related to information asymmetries. Most importantly these concerns 
seem to be greater when the non-listed bank is located in the same  country as the 
acquiring  bank.  This  is  a  particularly  interesting  result  requiring  further  empirical 
investigation especially considering that the present study is the first to examine such a 
distinction. 
The conclusions reached in the case when the CARs of the targets are examined are 
completely the opposite. Looking at the results reported in Table 6, we notice a strong 
reaction  at  all  examined  period  windows,  without  however  identifying  statistically 
significant differences between domestic  versus cross-border deals for either listed or 
non-listed acquirers. These are particularly interesting results indicating significant value 
creation for the shareholders of the targets even for cross-border deals  as shareholders 
probably  assess  the  deal  being  positive  in  terms  of  transferring  expertise  from  the 
acquirer to the target as in most cases the deal involves a larger and more sophisticated 
acquirer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns of targets for different classifications of acquirers 
(GARCH estimation) 
 
 Acquirer listed (N=48) Acquirer not-listed (N=25) 
CAR (%) CAR 
difference 
 
 
 
(3)=(2)-(1) 
CAR (%) CAR 
difference 
 
 
 
(3)=(2)-(1) 
Event 
window 
Domestic 
deals 
(N=34) 
(1) 
Cross- 
border 
deals 
(N=14) 
 
(2) 
Domestic 
deals 
(N=18) 
(1) 
Cross- 
border 
deals 
(N=5) 
 
(2) 
 
[-20; 0] 
[-10; 0] 
[-1; 1] 
0 
[-10; 10] 
[-20; 20] 
 
6.761,2 
 
4.941,2 
 
4.691,2 
 
2.311,2 
 
8.111,2 
 
9.951,2 
 
4.941,2 
 
4.281,2 
 
3.221,2 
 
2.201,2 
 
4.801,2 
 
5.141,2 
 
1.82 
 
0.66 
 
1.47 
 
0.11 
 
3.31 
 
4.81 
 
6.311,2 
 
4.451,2 
 
2.601,2 
 
1.941,2 
 
6.161,2 
 
8.021,2 
 
6.201,2 
 
5.171,2 
 
2.241,2 
 
0.72 
 
7.751,2 
 
7.161,2 
 
0.10 
 
-0.72 
 
0.36 
 
1.22 
 
-1.60 
 
0.86 
Notes: 1, 2 denote significance at the 5% level of significance for the BMP and the Corrado tests 
respectively. 
* (**) denote significance at the 5% (10%) level of significance for the CAR difference 
(t-test). 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 The determinants of value creation 
 
4.2.1 Estimations based on OLS 
 
The results presented in the previous section provide an interesting input for a 
more  detailed   analysis  regarding  the  determinants  of  abnormal  return,  especially 
considering that only two attempts have so far been undertaken in the literature (Campa 
and Hernando, 2006, Beitel et al., 2003)  to  analyse the factors that explain the M&A 
success in the European banking sector. Also, in those two cases fundamentals are not 
strongly related to abnormal returns possibly indicating the difficulty of  investors to 
assess the financial viability of the deal at the announcement date. 
 
 
 
 
 
Equation (10)  was  initially  estimated  for  the  whole  cross-section  (the  whole 
sample) with the dependent variable being the CAR[-1, +1]. The CAR choice refers to a 
small period around the announcement date in order to exclude the impact of information 
leakages.13  As explanatory  (independent) variables, we used the variables presented in 
Table 3 and the results from the estimation of equation (10) are presented in Table 7. 
Univariate models were estimated in order to identify the potential sole effect of 
each variable.14 The results indicate that the binary variables have a positive effect on the 
CARs while the  balance sheet data, with the exception of the Nii-Ti variable, report a 
negative effect. Looking at the  significance of the coefficients though it appears that a 
statistically significant and positive effect on the  CAR is identified for banks that are 
targets rather than acquirers or the deal is a domestic one. On the other hand, ROE and 
Size appear to have a significant negative effect on the CARs, a result indicating  that 
deals between banks smaller in size or less profitable may be more beneficial. Also, it 
may provide an indication that larger and more profitable banks have more chances of 
creating value for their shareholders by acquiring smaller and less profitable banks as it 
will be easier to efficiently proceed  with the necessary re-organisation needed. Also, 
although the variables Listed and Nii-Ti are not  statistically significant at a level of 
significance of up to 10%,15  they were identified as being considerably more important 
compared to the remaining variables. Therefore, there is some indication that a deal 
involving either a listed bank or a bank having a high Nii-Ti ratio, that is to say a bank 
that focuses on a relatively  stable source of income, may add value to shareholders. 
Examining the significant variables using a  multivariate model we observed that the 
Target  variable  clearly  dominates,  being  virtually  the  only   one  that  matters.  Re- 
estimating the model excluding its effect, the results from the multivariate  estimation 
support those from the univariate ones. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13  The CAR[-20, +20] was also used and the results did not present any qualitative differences. 
14  Note that all regression results were tested for autocorrelation, multicollinearity and heteroscedasicity 
to ensure that none of these conditions are violated. 
15  The p-values for these two variables approach 0.20. 
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4.2.2 Estimation based on Probit method 
 
Equation (11) was estimated using the Probit model. This will give us a further 
indication  whether a probability of producing positive CARs is increasing when the 
bank’s  characteristics  are  classified  above  or  below  their  cross-section  median.  The 
results reported in Table 8 verify the signs identified in Table 7 a fact that enhances the 
previous discussion. However, the statistical significance of the variables in the present 
case  is  much  weaker  and  only  the  Target  and  Eff  variables  remained  statistically 
significant  reinforcing  the  already  mentioned  effect.  This  gives  an  indication  that  a 
market for corporate control exist in the European banking sector suggesting that the 
control of a badly managed bank will be transferred to a better managed one increasing 
the  expectation  for  a  turnaround  story.  In  addition,  the  Eff  variable  suggests  that  a 
relatively more efficient bank that enters into an M&A deal decreases the probability of 
creating positive CARs. A potential explanation for this cannot be isolated from the one 
offered  for  the  ROE  variable  above.  That  is  to  say,  there  is  an  indication  that  the 
shareholders of an efficient bank may be worried about the prospects of the deal. 
 
 
4.2.3 Determinants of the share price reaction of acquirers and targets 
 
Although the analysis presented above offers useful insights regarding the general 
determinants of the share price reaction to an M&A deal, it does not clearly differentiate 
the  results  between  the  two  groups,  acquirers  and  targets,  and  therefore  the  clear 
determinants  for  each  group  cannot  be   identified.  Hence,  we  also  explore  the 
fundamentals of a matching sample of acquirers and targets  in order to identify the 
determinants that may affect the share price reaction of each group. We note  that  data 
availability restricts the sample to listed banks only. 
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A new  set  of  variables  is  utilised  that  are  simply  derived  by  dividing  the 
respective variables for acquirers by those of the targets. Basic descriptive statistics of the 
new variables are reported in Table 9 indicating that acquirers compared to targets are in 
general more profitable, larger in size,  more liquid, have lower credit risk, are more 
efficient and their income sources are more diversified. 
Table 9 
 
Basic descriptive statistics for a matching sample of acquirers and targets 
  
Relroe 
 
Relsize 
 
Relliq 
 
Relprov 
 
Releff Rel-Nii_Ti 
Mean 
Median 
Std. Dev. 
Obs 
2.41 
1.42 
2.82 
48 
1.28 
1.19 
0.26 
48 
1.16 
1.05 
0.50 
48 
0.82 
0.69 
0.76 
48 
0.88 0.85 
0.89 0.83 
0.17 0.25 
48 48 
Notes: Relroe is the ratio of the ROE of the acquirers to the ROE of the targets, Relsize is the ratio of the 
natural logarithms of assets of the acquirers to the natural logarithm of assets of the targets, Relliq is 
the loans to deposits ratio of the acquirers divided by the respective ratio of the targets,  Relprov is 
the provisions to total loans ratio of the acquirers divided by the respective ratio of the targets, Releff 
is the cost to income ratio of the acquirers divided by the respective ratio of the targets, Rel_Nii_Ti 
is the proportion of the interest-related income of the acquirers divided by the respective proportion 
of the targets. 
 
 
Table 10 reports the results for both acquirers and targets. Again, both univariate 
and multivariate OLS regressions are applied as well as a multivariate Probit. The results 
suggest that fundamentals provide a weak explanation of the value creation of the M&A 
deals and mainly for targets.  We note however that the statistical significance of the 
results  may  be  affected  by  the  small  size   of  the  sample,  and  therefore,  without 
overlooking this limitation, we base the discussion on the signs of the coefficients, that is 
on the direction of the effect. 
Looking at the acquirers first, we note that their shareholders may be better off 
when there is an M&A deal involving a less profitable target that is also smaller in size. 
However, when targets are  characterised by low liquidity, higher credit risk and low 
efficiency, then the deal is less value creating for the shareholders of the acquirers as they 
probably are concerned not only about the overall cost of the deal when these factors are 
taken into account but also about the scope of the deal. By contrast, there are indications 
that deals with targets presenting lower income generation from interest related activities 
(earnings diversification) are more beneficial for acquirers. 
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The results for the targets reinforce the previous findings that being a target is a 
good enough reason for their shareholders, as fundamentals, apart from the signs, do not 
indicate a statistically significant effect on abnormal returns. In general though, looking 
at the signs of the coefficients, the results indicate that shareholders of the targets may be 
better off when the deal involves a larger, more liquid and lower credit risk acquirer that 
also superior efficiency ratios. 
The results concerning the relative performance (Relroe) and the relative focus on 
income generation (Rel-Nii_Ti) are puzzling as their negative signs suggest that abnormal 
returns for the targets are negatively affected when the acquirers are more profitable and 
less diversified. This may reflect the concern of shareholders that the restructuring plan 
required to improve the profitability of the target may affect, at least in the short-run, the 
price of the target’s share. Regarding the Rel-Nii_Ti case it may reflect the concern that 
the business of the targets may lose the advantage offered by their  specialisation in 
market segments in which income is generated by non-interest related activities. On the 
other hand, the negative sign may indicate that the fact the acquirers and the targets do 
not focus on the same line of business may reduce the economies of scale and hence the 
potential for cost savings. 
Probit  estimation  supports  the  findings  although  again  the  weak  statistical 
significance reduces the strength of inferences requiring further investigation in this area 
of research. This conclusion is strengthened in the face of the weak results of previous 
attempts (Beitel et al., 2003, Lepetit et al., 2004). 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this study, by utilising a standard event study type analysis for a sample of 
European banks and spanning a period of 15 years, the impact of announced M&As on 
banks’  stock  prices  was   examined.  According  to  the  results,  overall,  an  M&A 
announcement does not seem to create value for the shareholders of acquirers as opposed 
to the positive and significant value creation for the shareholders of the targets. 
Another important finding is that cross-border expansion is not value creating for 
acquirers suggesting that despite the continuous efforts of all relevant authorities to create 
a more integrated market for financial services in Europe, shareholders prefer their banks 
 
 
to be active only in domestic markets. This evidence shows the concern of investors for 
information  transparency  in  cross-border  deals  as  well  as  their  belief  that  existing 
differences in cultural, legal or accounting factors between countries will count against 
the success of growth potential and cost reduction that is expected from a cross-border 
deal. 
 
On the other hand, shareholders of the targets benefit from both domestic and 
cross-border  deals. An additional interesting finding is the negative abnormal returns 
observed for acquirers when the shares of the target are not listed in an organised stock 
exchange indicating the concern regarding  information asymmetries that are generally 
reduced  by  the  disciplinary  and  monitoring  function  of  the  stock  market.  Again, 
shareholders of the targets enjoy value creation irrespectively of the listed  status or 
otherwise of the acquirer. 
Attempting to explain the observed abnormal returns based on major balance 
sheet items of the banks we reached the conclusion that shareholders of acquirers seem to 
benefit from deals with smaller and less profitable banks generating a significant portion 
of their income from non-interest related  activities and preferably having their shares 
listed  on  a  stock  market.  However,  they  are  also   concerned  when  the  target  is 
characterised by low liquidity and efficiency and heightened credit risk.  In contrast to 
these,  shareholders  of  the  targets  enjoy  positive  abnormal  return  regardless  of  the 
fundamentals of the deal, although there is a weak indication that deals with larger, more 
liquid, banks with lower credit risk and being more efficient focusing on interest-related 
activities are preferable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions are described on his Web site, 
 
http://www.geerthofstede.com 
 
 
 
The cultural distance index employed in the present study is a weighted index based on 
the following four factors: 
 
1) The  Power  Distance  Index  that  focuses  on  the  degree  of  equality,  or  inequality, 
between people in the country's society. A High Power Distance ranking indicates that 
inequalities of power and wealth  have been allowed to grow within the society. These 
societies are more likely to follow a caste system that does not allow significant upward 
mobility  of  its  citizens.  A  Low  Power  Distance  ranking  indicates  the  society  de- 
emphasizes the differences between citizen's power and wealth. In these societies equality 
and opportunity for everyone is stressed. 
 
2) Individualism that focuses on the degree the society reinforces individual or collective 
achievement and interpersonal relationships. A High Individualism ranking indicates that 
individuality and individual rights are paramount within the society. Individuals in these 
societies may tend to form a larger number of looser relationships. A Low Individualism 
ranking typifies societies of a more collectivist nature with close ties between individuals. 
These  cultures  reinforce  extended  families  and  collectives  where  everyone   takes 
responsibility for fellow members of their group. 
 
3) Masculinity that focuses on the degree the society reinforces, or does not reinforce, 
the traditional masculine work role model of male achievement, control, and power. A 
High Masculinity ranking indicates the country experiences a high degree of gender 
differentiation. In these cultures, males dominate a significant portion of the society and 
power structure, with females being controlled by male domination. A Low Masculinity 
ranking  indicates  the  country  has  a  low  level  of  differentiation  and  discrimination 
between genders. In these cultures, females are treated equally to males in all aspects of 
the society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4) Uncertainty Avoidance Index that focuses on the level of tolerance for uncertainty 
 
and ambiguity  within  the  society  -  i.e.  unstructured  situations.  A  High  Uncertainty 
Avoidance  ranking  indicates  the  country  has  a  low  tolerance  for  uncertainty  and 
ambiguity. This creates a rule-oriented society that institutes laws, rules, regulations, and 
controls in order to reduce the amount of  uncertainty. A Low Uncertainty Avoidance 
ranking indicates the country has less concern about ambiguity and uncertainty and has 
more tolerance for a variety of opinions. This is reflected in a society  that is less rule 
oriented, more readily accepts change, and takes more and greater risks. 
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